Urban reconstruction as a complex process: reflections on post-1945 Berlin

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Abstract:

In Berlin, a significant share of current building activity is on sites that were bombed in 1945, and can be considered a part of the post-war reconstruction. The duration of reconstruction, a particularity of Berlin’s experience, is highlighted by Denis Bouquet as he traces the process of the city’s reconstruction following the destructions of the Second World War to the present day. He also points out how reconstruction has catalysed and shaped the various phases of architecture, planning and urbanism in Berlin. Moreover, after almost 30 years after the fall of the wall and 75 years after the partial destruction of the city, reconstruction remains an entry point to its understanding.

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Introduction

At the end of the Second World War, in May 1945, the city of Berlin was in a state of profound distress. Numerous waves of aerial bombings - employing incendiary techniques and deliberately targeting civilian neighbourhoods - had devastated a substantial part of the built structure. Most of the city’s infrastructure, from railways and roads to public services, as well as factories and production sites, was also destroyed. About 10% of the buildings of the city were completely destroyed, 8% severely damaged and another 10% so significantly damaged that they were unusable without heavy restoration. Another 20% were in a condition where reuse was possible following light to medium reparations.

In addition to the destruction coming from the air, ground fighting also caused enormous damages: the Soviet artillery had made its way into the capital city of the Third Reich using violent techniques of penetration and destruction. Up until the final minutes of the totalitarian and genocidal national socialist regime, street fighting continued to damage the buildings and take a severe toll on the civilian population. At the end of the war, Berlin, in this deplorable state, hosted tens of thousands of displaced Germans fleeing the advance of the Red Army. Misery was everywhere. It is in this context that the reconstruction of the city began. It was going to be a long task.

In 2019, while a lot has been done in various institutional, economical and ideological contexts, one cannot really say that this process is over. A significant share of the current building activity in Berlin is on sites that were bombed in 1945, and can be considered as part of the post-war reconstruction, or sometimes re-reconstruction.

The first reflection on the reconstruction process of Berlin following the massive destructions of the Second World War is its duration. Reconstruction was not only a central issue in the late-1940s and during the 1950s and 1960s, but it also shaped the city and the postures of urbanism and architectural development in the decades that followed. The case of Berlin underscores the fact that reconstruction is a long process, even when a city has been the object of intense political attention. Reconstruction cannot be considered a short sequence, and must necessarily be perceived from its very first phases as a dynamic trajectory that will orientate, determine and shape architecture and urbanism in the city for decades. Reconstruction, according to Berlin, has to be determined by an adaptive perspective. Early plans and decisions have to allow for future visions to develop, and even to challenge this early framework in the case of changing plans, social needs, or demographic and economic conditions. No static, closed, time-bound and horizon-limited vision of...
reconstruction is desirable. What the case of Berlin further illustrates is that, even in a place where comprehensive architectural and urban theories and cultures were present at various levels of society, it is often half-measures and pragmatic visions that prevailed. In other words, early visions of reconstruction cannot be deemed impervious, time-resistant and self-sufficient. They have to integrate the possibility of constant negotiation, renegotiation and reinterpretation.

Another major lesson is that reconstruction was central to shaping the phases of the history of architecture, planning and urbanism in Berlin. With its complex dynamic involving multiple layers of expertise, sometimes contradictory ideological slogans and drivers, numerous conflicts, controversies and mistakes, as well as various levels of decision-making processes, reconstruction played a pivotal role in defining urban planning and governance. For better or worse, it has made Berlin one of the main focuses of urban and architectural discussions in Europe over the past 75 years.

In the following narration of the various phases of the reconstruction of Berlin, the accent will be put on the main ideas that have emerged from the study of this long process in the context of collective reflections on contemporary processes of urban reconstruction. History, of course, is not a reservoir of ready-made lessons, Europe is not historically or morally in the position to provide such lessons, and no solution is transferable without severe and critical examination, as well as contextualization. Some reflections on the case of Berlin, however, might be useful in the context of discussions on other processes of urban reconstruction. Reconstruction not only implies a challenging discussion on the nature of built heritage, the categories of heritage protection and the instruments of architectural and urban transformation. It also entails considering the impact of ideas of the cities and urban societies in relation to the actual efforts at rebuilding the parts that were destroyed or damaged. Reflecting on reconstruction goes far beyond mere physical reparation: it is a social, political and ideological process. The history of reconstruction is also a history of ideologies and historical constructions.1 The best way to avoid mistakes and their induced historical inertia is to critically examine all the aspects at stake during the very early phases, including the numerous social, political, environmental, aesthetic and functional challenges related to reconstruction decisions.

The crucial importance of the early stages of reconstruction

In the case of war damages that challenged the very readability of the urban structure at various key points of the city, the first phase of the reconstruction was, paradoxically, one of further destruction. Destroying the ruins and evacuating the rubble were in no way neutral processes responding to objective criteria. Rather, they represented the early implementation of choices, whose criteria were strongly culturally, professionally and ideologically connoted. Moreover, widespread inertia impacted on the built substance and readability of the urban structure.

In Berlin in 1945, damage assessments and decisions on whether or not to keep a building were not impartial. It was an active phase of

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imposing visions of experts and institutions that were already engaged in implementing a precise idea of the city. Destroying the remains of a bombed building not only meant losing its material substance. In many cases it also meant erasing the very trace of the structure of the city, thus participating in the further weakening of the inherited historical urban composition. In such a way, the clearing of the ruins cannot be considered as separate to reconstruction: it is a phase of reconstruction and it must be theorized and practically organized as such. The method, extent and timing of the clearing works, as well as what the ruins represent and what is to replace them, are already crucial phases of the reconstruction process.

In Berlin, this dimension has been largely ignored in most existing narratives of the reconstruction, but seems ex-post to have constituted a crucial moment. The surveys of the destructions, as they were later understood, exaggerated the extent of destruction with the tacit intent to allow reconstruction to start from a blank slate. Many buildings that might have been appropriate for restoration were destroyed between 1945 and the end of the 1940s for the sake of fulfilling a particular vision of reconstruction; that of the planners in charge. If an early lesson from Berlin can be drawn, it might be to: consider ruin clearing as an active phase of reconstruction, and examine the extent of the impacted areas in early discussions on reconstruction itself.

Another aspect of the early stages of the reconstruction of Berlin worth reflecting on is the importance of a more or less spontaneous de facto reconstruction. Due to severe shortages of building materials, many buildings in Berlin were repaired first by their inhabitants and then with the help of professionals (sometimes with public funds). This was carried out on the basis of a pragmatic vision to: (a) prepare for the winters of 1945 and 1946; (b) return the evacuees to their homes; and (c) house displaced populations. This method of prosaic reconstruction was very significant in the early years.

In the Berlin of the late 1940s, defining the roles of the various institutions and professions in reconstruction processes was the source of strong conflict, negotiation and compromise. Many experts (architects and planners) that had been working under the national socialist regime were authorized to remain active in the administration of the city, become owners of private studios, or contribute to works of public interest. Beyond the eviction of the most famous Nazi architect Albert Speer, numerous members of the Nazi planning offices were able to quickly find important positions in Berlin. Reflecting on reconstruction thus implies a reflection on such continuities: on their meaning in terms of ideology and moral positioning, as well as in terms of inertia in planning perspectives, architectural practices and networks of professional connivance. Similarly, the post-1945 reconstruction decisions of the forces that had participated in the destruction of the city (Soviet Army, and United States and British Air Forces) within their respective occupation zones had a symbolic and violent impact on Berlin. There was also the question of architects who went into exile after 1933 to Moscow, the United States, Turkey or Shanghai according their possibilities for escape, personal and political choices, or professional opportunities. They belonged to a generation that had collectively reshaped architecture and planning in the 1920s, inventing the modernist aesthetic, posture and method. Some of their colleagues had joined the administration of the Nazi regime, while others had stayed in Germany in less active situations.


3 The Soviet army confiscated the production of many German factories in order to send building materials to Russia.

4 Speer was jailed and prosecuted not specifically as an architect, but for his role as Hitler’s Minister of Armaments and, as such, was involved in the planning and material execution of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The year 1945 was a delicate moment of redefining personal relations, as well as professional and symbolic hierarchies. Between the end of the war and the early 1950s, architectural journals and circles extensively discussed this question. Would the new Berlin be inspired, or even designed, by Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969) and Walter Gropius (1883-1969)? Would the influence of the Ostmoderne Bauhaus generation serve as a guideline for the reconstruction? What the study of this period teaches, however, is that things were much more complicated. In 1947, General Lucius D. Clay invited Walter Gropius to Germany for a series of conferences. It was already clear that this figure of the pre-war Berlin architectural scene was not going to be the mastermind of the reconstruction. In his speeches, Gropius called for linking physical reconstruction to the democratization of decision-making processes and of society in general. The context was not only post-totalitarian, but also the nascent Cold War. Other conferences were organized by Hans Blumenfeld (1892-1988) and Samuel Zisman (1908-1970), who worked in Bavaria in planning reconstruction, but it was soon clear that there was no American model to be applied or even proposed for the reconstruction of Berlin. Cultural influences - by architects linked to the Bauhaus generation, or by US architects, and exiles or former exiles in Moscow or elsewhere - played a huge role, yet direct actions were extremely limited. The post-war period was a moment of constituting a new sphere of expertise and, most of all, one that comprised of complex negotiation and contextual elements that could not be reduced to architectural history or models.

Among such contextual elements was the inertia of concepts and postures in urban planning formulated during previous historical phases. There was, for example, the lasting influence of conceptions of urban transformation inherited from the Nazi period. During the Third Reich, massive destructions were planned and partially implemented in view of forming an urban scenography of huge proportions at the service of the image and propaganda of the regime. The framework was the 1937 Law for the Redesign of German Cities. Yet the Law not only permitted vast demolitions in the name of the regime’s monumental self-image, but also for hygienic considerations and functionalist visions that were not entirely disconnected from the way urban planning had evolved internationally during the 1920s and 1930s. Albert Speer, the Generalbaubamspektor der Reichshauptstadt (General Inspector of the Building Section of the Capital City of the Empire), and his office had designed Germany as the capital city of a totalitarian regime. Speer also directed, in the context of the persecution of the Jewish population, works of urban renewal that were conceived on a violent and destructive basis and aimed at redesigning the relationship between the built structure and the ground. This vision planned the partial destruction of the city, largely the nineteenth century built heritage, and the destruction of 5% to 10% of the city structure, i.e. more than 50,000 apartments. Hence, the fact that reconstruction discussions in the profession did not happen in a fully unprepared context meant that many offices had, in effect, been working on a profound and traumatic revision of the urban structure for years.

Beyond this horizon and chronology, there was also the influence of planning approaches that built on ideas formulated within the modernist
movement or the cultural sphere attached to it. For some, post-1945 destruction was a unique opportunity to implement vast planning programmes that supposed the dissolution and destruction of the inherited urban structure. Suddenly the urban landscape was not far from resembling the blank slate that modernist architects had been working towards for virtually two decades. Similar to London, where this context was decisive in shaping its rebuilt neighbourhoods, there was a strong influence of ideas that had been discussed in the 1920s and expressed during the 1930s around, notably, Le Corbusier’s formulation of the Athens Charter in 1933. But in the case of Berlin, the impact of such visions combined with a complex reality resulted in the rapid mitigation of all-encompassing ideas. The new Berlin was not going to be built from a blank slate.

Another early question in reconstruction was its financing. In the few months following the end of the Second World War, Berlin was fast becoming one of the central theatres where the impending Cold War would be played out. Decision-making processes regarding reconstruction were partly conditioned by the emergence of the ideology of the Marshall Plan, formally the European Recovery Program (ERP) of 1947. Within this framework, huge funds were allocated to the reconstruction of Germany. The Soviet occupation zone refused this help and denounced the ideological bias it represented, and ‘there was no consistent, high-level American policy on what, if anything, to do about helping the Germans repair the damage left by the war’. This did not mean a lack of significant support for Berlin: ERP funds were instrumental in efforts aimed at rebuilding factories, schools and even housing units, but the funds were not specifically focused on an urban initiative. What the case of Berlin makes clear, however, is that the question of foreign financing is never neutral and goes hand-in-hand with ideological conditions that need to be decrypted. In Berlin, the progressive separation of the East (Soviet occupation zone) and the West (United States, British and French occupation zones) conditioned reconstruction for more than four decades.

The first steps towards forming a reconstruction framework for the city took place prior to its division, when it was still under Soviet occupation. On May 17, 1945 the architect Hans Scharoun (1893-1972) was appointed head of the Berlin Planning and Housing Bureau. A few days earlier, he had been chosen by General Nikolai Bersarin, the Soviet commander of Berlin, as a member of the new municipal administration. One of the administration’s first tasks in 1945 was the creation of a precise map of the damages. Scharoun ordered the destruction of the Gestapo quarter, which had been partially damaged, and the Chancery of the Reich, seeking to erase these landmarks of the totalitarian regime from the symbolic landscape of the city. He also instructed that the demolition of the ruins be extensive.

The dominant idea was to unlock the overly densified city inherited from the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. But his actions did not result in a blank slate. In mid-1945 Scharoun also launched,
together with the former International Congresses of Modern Architecture (CIAM) architect Wils Ebert,\(^\text{12}\) the design of a new master plan. Traffic engineer Peter Friedrich was asked by Scharoun to develop ideas for a linear development of the city along the Spree Valley. Scharoun’s team, the Planungskollektiv,\(^\text{13}\) had a vision to create an urban landscape inspired by the Athens Charter. Due to the opportunities provided by the bombing of the city and ruin clearing, a new modernist urban grid would have provided the framework in which housing cells could have been inserted into a green landscape. In the same year, Scharoun integrated another planning collective into the process: a group of architects working in the Zehlendorf neighbourhood on options inspired by the 1910 Jansen Plan and on the hypothesis of a continuation and reinterpretation of the logic of the 1862 Hobrecht Plan. Even before the city was formally divided by geopolitical boundaries, the administration worked on two plans with two separate teams, both focused on completely different options and philosophies.

Scharoun’s Kollektivplan (collective plan) proposed a separation of functions and the creation of a network of large avenues. The proposed plan was met with great suspicion by the Americans, however, as the plan aligned to a context of a possible abolition of private property rather than one of restoring the properties.\(^\text{14}\)

In the ruins of the Palace of Berlin, Scharoun organized the 1946 exhibition Berlin plant – erster Bericht (Berlin Plans – First Report) about the perspective of the reconstruction of the city. This event created a new sphere of discussion within the profession, and had a significant impact in the press and on the population, thus constituting an important moment of collective reflection on the future of the city. After the elections of October 20, 1946, that saw the victory of the Social Democrats, Scharoun was replaced by Karl Bonatz as Director of the Planning and Housing Bureau. The plan that resulted from this political and professional transition was a much less radical rupture with the city of the nineteenth century and its structure. It consisted on a principle of reality.\(^\text{15}\) Subsequently, the separation of the city into two zones became a clear and defining factor. From 1948 onwards, the reconstruction of Berlin proceeded according to the different logics of the East and the West.

### Rebuilding Berlin in the context of the Cold War

In 1948, the physical division of the city materialized through the reinforcement of checkpoints between the East and the West, followed by the Soviet blockade of West Berlin. This growing tension resulted in the creation of two separate local administrations in 1949. In the West, the new administration was led by Ernst Reuter (1889-1953)\(^\text{16}\) and, in the East, the administration was headed by Friedrich Ebert (1894-1979).\(^\text{17}\) The teams planning the reconstruction ceased to coordinate their work: the group for Zehlendorf remained in the West whereas most of the members of the Planungskollektiv worked in the East. Informal meetings, however, continued between both teams.

In East Berlin, reconstruction between the 1950s and 1970s was characterized by the strong influence of ideology. In 1947, Scharoun created the Institut für Bauwesen (Architectural Institute) with architects Hermann Henselmann (1905-1995) and Kurt Liebknecht (1905-1994).\(^\text{18}\) There was a clear influence of political image and surveillance on reconstruction processes of the city, which became even stronger with the onset of the Cold War. While Scharoun was reflecting in the spirit of the Kollektivplan on the realization

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\(^\text{12}\) Wils Ebert was known for working on the hypothesis of a reconstruction of European centres ex-novo since the 1930s.


\(^\text{14}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{16}\) Ernst Reuter had been a follower and advisor of Lenin after the First World War and, after having been expelled from the Communist Party, became a Social Democrat urban planner in Berlin, as well as the founder of the local transportation authority. During his exile in Turkey, he created the urban planning department of the University of Ankara.

\(^\text{17}\) Friedrich Ebert was the son of the Social Democratic President of the Republic of Weimar. A Social Democrat himself, in 1946 he joined the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).

\(^\text{18}\) Kurt Liebknecht had worked with Ernst May during his exile in the Soviet Union and had been asked by the Soviet authorities to supervise the organization of the profession in Berlin.
of the first housing cell in the Friedrichshain neighbourhood, he was fired and his institute was closed. Scharoun, who lived in the Western part of city, remained there and ceased to work for the communist regime. The 1949 Master Plan Ersten Aufbauplan für das Zentrum des Neuen Berlins (First construction plan for the centre of New Berlin) was short-lived.

In 1950, new directives arrived from Moscow, and the architects, planners and politicians in charge of the reconstruction of Berlin even travelled to the capital of the Soviet Union. The new philosophy comprised an explicit rejection of the Bauhaus aesthetic and of many central features of modernism. This ideologically-driven shift in perspective insisted on a new German architecture, with references to historical architectural discourses. It did not evoke the possibility of reconstruction aligned to reproducing pre-existing buildings and forms. It consisted of the invention of a new architectural language, a new urban structure.

Berlin demonstrates that historicizing reconstruction does not necessarily mean reconstructing what existed. This complex nexus needs to be carefully decrypted. What the Berlin case also illustrates is that the phases and postures of reconstruction cannot be explained solely by architectural history or by political choices. They were a mix of both, and the result of complex interactions.

On July 27, 1950 the German Democratic Republic presented this new doctrine in the booklet 16 Grundsätze des Städtebaus (The Sixteen Principles of Urban Planning), which outlined the orientation of reconstruction for the upcoming years. Principle 6 stated that cities have centres and that the idea and existence of such centres must be a dominant principle in the organization of the whole city. This statement represented a distancing from the Athens Charter, Le Corbusier and Scharoun rather than a will to preserve the existing city centre.

Another important decision of the early 1950s in East Berlin was that the zones designed to be rebuilt were among the first in which socialist principles of landownership were applied. The end of individual property rights was an early instrument of reconstruction. The way in which property rights were handled, from ideology to practicalities, strongly determined the shape of the rebuilt city and its relationship with the pre-bombed urban structure, architectural heritage and urban society. The zones to be rebuilt were the object of violent policies of ruin destruction. The main project that resulted from this ideological posture was the construction of Stalinallee. This huge avenue, with neo-classical inspirations for its façades, substantially modified the urban structure. Various blocks that had been more

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20 In the 1960s, in the context of De-Stalinization, the avenue was renamed Karl-Marx-Allee.
or less damaged in 1945, were destroyed. Resulting from a 1951 urban design competition, the architects Egon Hartmann, Richard Paulick, Hans Hopp, Karl Souradny and Kurt Leucht were each awarded the construction of a segment of the avenue, under the overall coordination of Hermann Henselmann. The modernist architects adapted their work to the ideology and aesthetic representations of the authorities. In 1953, the posture of destruction of the traces of the inherited city culminated in the destruction of the ruins of the Palace of Berlin, the former residence of the Hohenzollern Dynasty. A modernist, multifunction public building, the Palast der Republik (Heinz Graffunder and Karl-Ernst Swora architects) was built on the site in the 1970s.

In contrast to the historicist references of the 1950s, during this period in general, East Berlin became the theatre of a new architectural scenography of a regime that insisted on modernity. From a practical point of view, however, most of the reconstruction was in the form of large housing estates that were built not only on the fringes of the city, but also in place of previously existing neighbourhoods very close to the city centre. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, hundreds of nineteenth century buildings were destroyed as part of a programme of erasing the existing urban structure (mostly more or less damaged nineteenth century buildings), resulting in the presence of large social housing units in the very heart of the city.

In West Berlin, what the Cold War confirmed was a renunciation of a reconstruction plan to mirror all-encompassing modernist visions. This did not mean that demolitions of entire blocks of more or less damaged buildings ceased, but the quantity of such demolitions remained invariable between 1949 and the early 1970s. Even if hundreds of buildings were renovated, a very significant share of the built structure was erased during medium- to large-scale operations.

The new city that emerged was marked by the importance of social housing and by a growing infrastructural ideal that exploited reconstruction as a tool of urban renewal. The lesson to be drawn from this phase is that an absence of a theorized destructive vision of reconstruction did not denote that reconstruction was not destructive. The infrastructuralist era, whose intensity was reinforced in 1960 with a further decision to accept and even promote a rupture with the inherited urban structure, led to what some scholars have labelled the ‘second destruction’. From the 1950s to 1970s, entire blocks that had been damaged during the 1945 bombings were destroyed in order to give way for huge infrastructural programmes. A whole network of urban motorways was built in West Berlin.

This traumatic endeavour, however, was largely absent in the urban debates of the time. Most attention concentrated on the 1957 Berlin International Architecture Exhibition (IBA Interbau) and its aftermath. In preparing for this event, the whole neighbourhood of Hansaviertel was cleared and an urban enclave was proposed to a series of internationally-acclaimed architects (Alvar Aalto, Oscar Niemeyer and Walter Gropius) as a blank slate. Interbau was conceived as a showcase of the city of the future.

Figure 7. Berlin, Hansaviertel. Architect: Walter Gropius. © Manfred Brückels/Wikimedia Commons


Reconstruction was theorized as a moment of reflection on urban planning and architecture. In 1958, the planning competition Berlin Hauptstadt caused geopolitical tension as it proposed motorways as the principle structuring element of West Berlin. The existing urban morphology was largely ignored. During the 1960s, Scharoun built the Philharmonie and Mies van der Rohe constructed the Neue Nationalgalerie on cleared areas near the former Potsdamer Platz. In Charlottenburg, an alternative centrality was reinforced in order to compensate for the fact that the entire former city centre belonged to the East. In terms of volume, however, most reconstruction efforts were in the form of social housing. The old urban structure was generally destroyed, and a new relationship between the ground and the built elements was introduced. The scale of the block that constituted the main structural element inherited from the Hobrecht Plan, tended to be replaced by much larger projects. But in West Berlin, the infrastructuralist and morphological excesses of the 1960s provoked a reaction, both political and aesthetic, against this traumatic form of reconstruction.

The emergence of the paradigm of critical reconstruction

In a city where many damaged buildings and wastelands existed even 30 years after the destructions, temporary uses were common. Moreover, they were part of the reconstruction processes. For example, squatters, often belonging to far-left clandestine housing communities, developed a pragmatic approach to reconstruction. Having chosen West Berlin as a way to avoid the military service of the Federal Republic of Germany and live an alternative urban ideal, the squatters occupied damaged and abandoned buildings. They developed strategies to make them liveable and political narratives to contest the urban strategies of the administration. Their idea of reconstruction throughout the 1960s and 1970s stood in stark contrast to the destructive reconstruction promoted by the administration. Paradoxically, their marginal, revolutionary and utopian ideals also supported a pragmatic rediscovery of the historical built heritage. Their rejection of the policies of the administration was also a denunciation of the urban form that these policies promoted, which were often at the expense of the urban structure and at the cost of the expulsion of the de facto inhabitants. This sphere, and the political consciousness it expressed and materialized, played an important role in debates about a change of paradigm in reconstruction.

The programme of planned, destructive urban renewal culminated in 1963 under Mayor Willy Brandt (1913-1992). In the context of the city

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divided by a wall since 1961, the question of West Berlin was more than ever the object of intense national and international attention. Confronted by growing protests against destructions, Brandt announced in 1964 that reconstruction should be implemented according to softer methods. Even though the Master Plan of 1965 aimed at drastically lowering urban density, the intensity of the destruction of the previous decade was no longer tolerated by the population and public opinion.27

A new generation of architects began to propose and formulate new attitudes. In 1971, Josef Paul Kleihues (1933-2004) was authorized to develop a project for the Vinetaplatz neighbourhood that responded to a new posture and embodied a new attitude towards reconstruction. He insisted on the scale of the project, respecting the block and the structure of the former city. Following other experiments in Wedding-Brunnenstrasse by Kleihues in the early 1970s, the idea of the block as the appropriate scale began to be widely adopted by architects. The rediscovery of the old structure induced the progressive emergence of a concept of urban reparation, which would become central to urban debates on reconstruction in the subsequent decade.28 In this regard, the beginning of the 1970s represented a huge turning point in the conceptualization of reconstruction. However, from a quantitative point of view, this posture remained marginal. In other words: destructions continued.

In 1975, on the occasion of the European Year of Heritage Protection, new steps were taken towards a better respect of the inherited city in reconstruction processes. Berlin introduced measures to protect the façades of existing buildings, even the previously despised conventional constructions of the nineteenth century. A cultural change was taking place, which was further driven by debates on reconstruction methods.

The idea for a new International Architecture Exhibition (IBA) emerged at the end of the 1970s, to be planned for 1984-1987. From a political point of view, the IBA embodied an effort by the ruling Social Democratic Party to soften its conflict with the far-left squatters. From an architectural point of view, it signalled the emergence of a potential form of post-modernism. From a planning point of view, it was the acknowledgment that reconstruction should respect the inherited structure of the city. It represented an important shift for urban planning and architecture in Europe. This is why the importance of IBA Berlin extended far beyond Berlin and reconstruction: under the term of ‘critical reconstruction’, it represented a whole new theorized paradigm of urbanism.29

For the IBA 1987, reconstruction meant urbanism and a synthetized spirit of a new approach. A central idea was to promote the city centre as a place to live, thus increasing the micro-scale liveability of neighbourhoods. During the preparation of this full-scale event, an exhibition was organized in 1984. Confirmed and emerging architects30 were invited to participate in the IBA and to propose buildings that responded to

Figure 10. Residential building in Vinetaplatz, by Josef Paul Kleihues. © Gunnar Klack/flickr


the new philosophy. The IBA had two sections: new buildings (Josef Paul Kleihues, around the Tegel neighbourhood) and old urban structures (Hardt Waltherr Hämer, mostly in the Kreuzberg neighbourhood).

As far as reconstruction was concerned, the IBA slogan was ‘step by step’ for a careful urban renewal. Destructions should be minimized and existing buildings should be repaired without expulsing the inhabitants. New buildings should be conceived as elements fitting in the inherited urban framework. No project should exceed the scale of the block and inhabitants should be asked to participate in decisionmaking processes according to precise and institutionalized procedures. The integration of Turkish migrants, who had largely been housed in Kreuzberg after 1961, was the object of positive discourses. Critical reconstruction was conceived as a democratic laboratory of a city of the future that would reconnect with the past after traumatic phases of erasure. Putting an end to the policy of destruction of the urban structure, the IBA induced a rediscovery of the value of archives. The idea of recycling the existing city comprised an environmentalist perspective and conscience. Avoiding evictions also meant proposing inhabitants to participate in the very of bombed apartment houses was a way for the administration to save on the construction costs of new social housing. Close attention was paid to public spaces, with squares - often in the interstices of the bombed city - becoming spaces of social interaction.

An important lesson from Berlin’s experience is that alongside critical reconstruction, urbanism and social policies tended to merge. In contrast to previous models that risked uniformity in the urban landscape, the IBA promoted a strong diversity of housing types. The ‘step by step’ philosophy was both an imperative of the temporalities of urban change centred on inhabitants, and a guarantee against out-of-scale initiatives.

In contrast to what most experts in West Berlin thought, however, a lot was also happening in the Eastern parts of the city. In the name of ‘complex reconstruction’, an important turning point in the history of planning and architecture was taking place during these very same years. On the occasion of the celebration of the 750th anniversary of the foundation of Berlin, reconstruction of the historic neighbourhood Nikolaiviertel was carried out according to principles of neo-historicism. Between pastiche and urban marketing propaganda tools, the neighbourhood symbolized a distancing from former dominant ideological postures in the communist world regarding history. The urban structure was not the same as the one that was bombed in 1945, but it was inspired by its shape and scale.

Amidst negotiations on postures of reconstruction between architects, planners and politicians, important symbolic changes were enacted in East Berlin between 1977 and 1987. There was also a change of attitude with regards to historic neighbourhoods like Prenzlauer Berg, dating back to the nineteenth century. Compared to the previous rhetoric of the regime that stigmatized it as a product of capitalism built to exploit the


32 Wunderlich, C. (ed.). 1989. Step by Step. Careful Urban Renewal in Kreuzberg. Berlin, STERN. The IBA, however, was not exempt from criticism. Some argued that just outside of the test neighbourhoods, demolitions and evictions continued (Autzen et al., 1984). Some also claimed that the sociological and political relevance of participation was ambiguous. Another ambiguity of the IBA is that it was unable to consider the reunification of the city.


working class, the accent progressively shifted towards viewing these buildings as embodying the memory of the working class. A change in reconstruction principles is often also a change of narrative. As a consequence of the ideological reinterpretation of Mietskasernen (rental barracks) as part of the socialist memory of the city, it was decided to stop destroying these structures in the name of socialist reconstruction. There was also a pragmatic imperative behind this shift: the Social Democratic Party realized it could not otherwise fulfil its promise to provide a house for every family. In Prenzlauer Berg, the test areas of Arnimplatz and Arkonaplatz were designed for this paradigmatic change.35 In the early 1980s, the Party provided building materials to inhabitants to reconstruct damaged buildings. It also provided technical guidance in the form of booklets and architectural consulting. Even though the regime continued until the end of the 1980s, cultural and political transformation had already been made in East Berlin before the fall of the wall in 1989 in order to build large housing estates. Beginning in 1990, a new turning point was imminent in interpreting what reconstruction means, with repercussions on the history of architecture and planning far beyond the mere horizon of destroyed cities.

Rebuilding Berlin after 1989

From an urban and architectural perspective, in spite of the incapacity of West Berlin’s recent IBA to consider the city as a whole, in the years leading up to 1989 Berlin experienced a relative reduction in the gap between the practices of the East and West. Both sides had decided to cease reconstruction policies through destruction, and had experimented with a post-modern approach to the inherited urban structure. From a political and professional point of view, however, the reunification was all but a merger. The generation of architects and planners that had gained competence and visibility during the IBA literally evicted their colleagues from the East. Beyond the ideological transition and suspicion of experts who had worked for the communist regime, this process was rigid and created frustration among those removed from the conversation.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, reconstruction was again a matter of national image in Eastern Europe.36 In Berlin, the attention immediately focused on the reconstruction of Potsdamer Platz, an important square of the pre-1945 city that had been left as a wasteland and divided by the wall since 1961. In 1990, it was clear that the fall of the wall opened up a new phase of the post-1945 reconstruction of the city,37 and Potsdamer Platz became for a decade one of the biggest construction sites on the continent. The process of reconstruction of the square had begun a few months before the fall of the wall when the Senate of Berlin announced its intention to redesign it for the 1995 National Garden Exhibition. After the fall of the wall, the area was divided into four lots sold to investors, and an international competition was organized for its general plan.38 According to early critics, the post-1989 reconstruction began on the basis of morphological and ideological ambiguities. Potsdamer Platz remained for at least a decade at the heart of conversations and controversies on the spirit of reconstruction in an era of neoliberalism and post-modernism.

35 Stimmann, H. 1985. Stadterneuerung in Ost-Berlin vom "sozialistischen Neuaufbau" zur "komplexen Rekonstruktion". Urban regeneration in East Berlin from „socialist reconstruction" to „complex reconstruction". Berlin, IBA. (In German.)
38 Heinz Hilmer and Christoph Sattler won first prize. Renzo Piano designed the area attributed to investor Daimler, and Helmut Jahn the one attributed to Sony.
Another important shift was happening at the scale of the whole city, under the aegis of Hans Stimmann, who was appointed chief of the planning bureau of the Senate. Stimmann, who had been working as an expert of urban change in the East during the IBA, aimed at expanding the methods and concepts of critical reconstruction to the former Eastern neighbourhoods. He also developed a vision of reconstruction that emphasized reconnecting with fragments of the old urban structure and even reconstituting the structure.

The references of this reconstruction posture were the urban forms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1996 and 1999, Stimmann managed to impose this vision in the form of a new Master Plan, the Planwerk Innenstadt. The concept of ‘European City’ was instrumental in the narrative that accompanied the plan and its contextualization. Stimmann’s effort also entailed constructing a discourse that sought to reinterpret the recent history of planning in Berlin. This quest for a lost city was ambiguous, as it implied severe judgements of intermediary phases that might also have been valued. The interpretation of the heritage of the 1862 Hobrecht Plan remained important in local conversations on reconstruction. But the denunciation of the fascination for a fixed temporal reference led to a confrontation between historicists and modernists. Moreover, it became one of the main criticisms of the evolution of the methods of critical reconstruction implemented between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s. In the context of economic depression and a desperate need to attract investors, this posture nevertheless allowed reconstruction to advance with a certain degree of coherence. But it paved the way for the strong gentrification of the 2010s that exploited the new urban landscape provided by a reconstruction that had progressively been distanced from some of its founding social ideals of the 1980s.

Figure 13. Aerial view of Potsdamer Platz in 2016. © Avda / avda-foto.de, Wikimedia Commons

Conclusions: contemporary debates on reconstruction

Almost 30 years after the fall of the wall, and almost 75 years after the partial destruction of the city, reconstruction is still an entry point to understanding architecture and planning in Berlin. One of the remaining issues is the reconstruction of the Palace of Berlin. Following the destruction of its ruins in 1953 and the construction of the Palast der Republik in the mid-1970s, strong debates emerged after the fall of the wall. Under Hans Stimmann, the decision was made to destroy the Palast der Republik. In 1994, a visual simulation of the reconstructed Schloss had been part of the debates. It was decided that reconstruction would be facilitated through a foundation and in the form of a public-private partnership. After multiple court procedures, the Palast der Republik was destroyed in 2006. Franco Stella, an Italian architect, won a competition for the construction of the Humboldt Forum, a building that reproduces the aesthetic of the castle from the outside and develops other functions inside. With this decision, Berlin might have caricatured itself in the direction of...
a pastiche reconstruction. For some, this kind of attitude towards reconstruction is a farce. Debates also arose concerning the surroundings of the reconstructed castle. Stimmann advocated for the creation of an old town that never really existed, inventing a historicized urban structure. Debates are still ongoing in Berlin.

Another current controversy concerns the Bauakademie (architecture academy). It was built in the 1830s according to plans by Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781-1841) and was one of the main symbolic references of Prussian architecture. Damaged during the bombings of 3 February 1945, the building was partially restored as part of the East German plan for the reconstruction of central Berlin. During the 1950s it hosted the East German Architecture Academy. It was not included in the destruction plan of 1953, during which the Palace of Berlin was destroyed, yet it was eventually destroyed in 1962 as part of the regime’s violent offensive against historical traces of the Prussian past. The building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic was built on the site. After the fall of the wall, this building was destroyed in the mid-1990s. Since then, debates and controversies on the reconstruction of the Bauakademie have been symbolic of the opposing opinions on heritage and reconstruction. At the beginning of the 2000s, a temporary visual representation of the academy was erected at the site. But a decision to fund its reconstruction has not yet been made, and the case of the academy remains the object of strong debate.

Berlin undeniably represents a highly specific case, and reflections on reconstruction processes that derive from the study of its evolution since 1945 cannot be considered universal lessons for all reconstruction endeavours. Every reconstruction configuration is unique. If the Berlin case can teach only one thing, it is that models should be considered with great care - and even challenged – with regards to their relevance and content.

The Berlin experience, however, invites experts involved in decision-making processes about urban reconstruction to consider a certain number of factors and to be wary of the illusion that reconstruction is a quick and simple process. It not only implies reflection on the nature and categories of heritage protection, and memory and its vectors, but also the weight and inertia of ideologies, professional representations and networks. Reflecting on reconstruction implies the analysis of complex decision-making processes and an understanding of the resulting built form, rather than the mere projection of static heritage, memories and ideas. Considering reconstruction is taking into account the relationship between the built element and society. The relevance of the Berlin case for contemporary reconstruction processes, on which reflection is already underway, is also to indicate that reconstruction in all its phases is urbanism. Similarly, what Berlin suggests is that, through reconstruction, it is not only the form, substance and life of damaged cities that is at stake. It is also humanity’s relationship with architecture, urbanism and society.

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