Culture-based urban resilience: post-war recovery of Sarajevo

by Amra Hadžimuhamedović*

Abstract:

For the citizens of Sarajevo, prioritizing the recovery of life was placed in parallel to the reconstruction of urbanity and cultural heritage. The city’s resilience during its siege from 1992 to 1996 and its post-war rehabilitation are a source of lessons learned on the access to postwar recovery of cities.

Amra Hadžimuhamedović analyses Sarajevo’s recovery in bello and post bellum. She examines how both positive and negative inferences can be gleaned from the actions when examined through the lens of a 3P (people-centred, place-based, policies) approach. While Sarajevo stands today as a vibrant city with a high level of public security, the scars of the war are still prevalent and the ongoing stage of post-recovery is challenging due to ambivalent development goals. According to the author, the recovery process must be based on a critical approach that takes into account the specific cultural, physical and historical context of a city.

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Introduction

Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have a special significance for Europe and for the whole world. (...) Indeed, it represents a crossroad of cultures, nations and religions, a status which requires the building of new bridges, while maintaining and restoring older ones, thus ensuring avenues of communication that are efficient, sure and fraternal.

At the turn of the millennium, Sarajevo became a paradigm of both urbicide and the recovery of heterogeneity of the urban fabric. It is an example of the success and failure of attempts to survive under military siege, during recovery after extensive destruction, through return following mass migration, and in implementing peace through the physical recovery of the city. Sarajevo is a city where the recovery of life was strategically placed in parallel to the commitment of its citizens to reconstruct its urbanity, and to make cultural heritage an unquestionable priority.

Since 1994, the international community has played a key role in the recovery of Sarajevo, with the underlying understanding of ‘the importance of maintaining Sarajevo […] as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and plurireligious centre’.

In 1995, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter the Dayton Agreement) was signed. Following the inclusion of Annex 8 on the Commission for the Preservation of National Monuments (hereinafter the Annex 8 Commission) in the Dayton Agreement, and especially after its remit was transferred to the Government of its citizens to reconstruct its urbanity, and to make cultural heritage an unquestionable priority.


2 Recovery, however, implies a holistic rehabilitation of some prior physical, social and economic environment (both tangible and intangible). Rebuilding itself does not equate to recovery, and it can be defined as reconstruction or renewal. Reconstruction in this case study primarily implies the kind of rebuilding that revives the earlier known state of a place.


Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2001, culture and cultural heritage played a central role in almost all recovery plans for Sarajevo. This makes the city a pioneering case that illustrates the importance of heritage for society and the value of its inclusion in post-war recovery processes.

The urbanity of Sarajevo was rehabilitated, and its historic urban landscape restored. However, the traces of war are still present 22 years after it ended, and the recovery is moving into a phase where the remaining ruins are seen more as a hindrance to urban development than as archaeological evidence of life under the siege. The symbolic role of these traces, as memorials of the destruction of Sarajevo’s urban fabric, is steadily decreasing in the cultural memory of the city’s residents. Unreconstructed spaces, including some of immense historical importance, are currently facing pressures of new construction and demolition. Today, Sarajevo is also a city of new generations, whose mental maps do not necessarily include either ruined buildings or their remains as memory reference points.

Furthermore, the post-war recovery of Sarajevo has not been a common topic of academic discussion and literature. Given that the city’s recovery is nearing completion, we could expect to see academic consideration of its progression, nature and consequences in the forthcoming period. Research on the challenges that Sarajevo faced from April 1992, as well as the response, would constitute an important case from which to draw lessons from in addressing contemporary urban recovery, and ensuring its success.

Figure 1. Historic Centre of Sarajevo in 2017. © Derviš Hadžimuhamedović

Context of the post-war recovery of Sarajevo

Geographical and political context

Sarajevo is the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), which constituted a federal unit of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1992. Situated in the valley of the Miljacka River surrounded by mountains, pre-war Sarajevo covered an area of 2,049 km² and was home to a population of 435,000. In April 1992, Sarajevo was the capital of a country that had just regained its independence and became internationally recognized. At the same time, it had begun a process of transformation from a single-party communist regime to a democratic system, and all forms of socialist economic and social order had just entered the initial stages of transition.

The siege of Sarajevo

Just when it was supposed to become the centre of the new development perspectives of Bosnia, Sarajevo was besieged and completely blocked off by a force of 18,000 soldiers equipped with heavy artillery that, over the course of more than...
three years, destroyed the city and terrorized its inhabitants. The Siege of Sarajevo began on 5 April 1992, the day that the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia as an independent state. As Bassiouni (1994) reports:

> On that date, thousands of persons took to the streets in spontaneous peace marches. The largest body of demonstrators headed towards the Parliament building and other buildings reportedly seized by Serb forces. Unidentified gunmen were then reported to have fired into the crowd. One protestor was confirmed dead.

All state institutions and public capacities were in an embryonic stage. Neither the authorities nor the citizens of Sarajevo were prepared for the bloodshed and destruction that ensued, nor did they believe that the siege would continue, as they considered an intervention by the United Nations military personnel was inevitable. Over the course of the 1,425 days of the siege, the inhabitants of Sarajevo were deprived of all forms of communication with the outside world. The relentless bombardments from the surrounding hills took a tremendous physical toll on the city and its inhabitants: 10,615 persons were killed, including 1,601 children.

**Conflict-driven migration as a part of an urban catastrophe**

Aside from extensive destruction to its urban fabric, the wartime impact on Sarajevo was also reflected in population mobility. Individuals and entire communities migrated in all directions. During the siege, the Bosnian Serb Army only allowed ‘special categories’ of the city’s population to leave in bus convoys, based on their ethnic cleansing strategy. At the same time, population movement within the divided city intensified.

After the siege was lifted, a few hundred thousand displaced persons from other parts of Bosnia passed through Sarajevo, with many of them settling in the city. The most dramatic population movement followed the signing of the Dayton Agreement. As the process for ‘the reintegration of Sarajevo’ began, the parts of the city formerly under occupation were returned to the jurisdiction of the Sarajevo Canton. The retreating army applied a scorched-earth policy. This was followed by long stretches of civilian cars carrying Bosnian Serbs out of Sarajevo.

**Administrative arrangements in Sarajevo after the Dayton Agreement**

In 1995, in line with the Dayton Agreement, Sarajevo was organized as a canton (1,277.3 km² with a population of 438,443) within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while areas of the suburbs of pre-war Sarajevo were organized into ‘Serb Sarajevo’, later renamed ‘East Sarajevo’ or Istočno Sarajevo (1,450 km² with a population of 61,560) in Republika Srpska. According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo is the capital of both the country and the two entities established under the Dayton Agreement. Both the forced migration of wartime and the administrative reorganization of Sarajevo resulted in ethnic homogenization.

**Estimate of war damage**

Determining the methodology for evaluating war damage was undertaken by public officials and experts in Sarajevo during the siege. Given the lack of access to assess buildings and infrastructure, such methodology only came into use in 1996. Some important information about...
the destruction of Sarajevo and the estimates of its scope were, however, already available during the siege. The UN Commission of Experts compiled a special report on Sarajevo. Over the course of the siege, according to their estimate, the city was hit by an average of 329 shells per day. The destruction of Sarajevo’s urban fabric is mentioned a number of times, and paragraph 190 states that “the chronology confirms that certain areas of the city have also been systematically shelled […] particularly cultural and religious structures and public utilities”. The final estimate of damage to housing counted more than 90,000 dwellings that were completely or partially destroyed.

Based on the above-mentioned methodology, the total direct war damage in Sarajevo was estimated at US$ 20 billion, and the total cost of the 1,435 priority projects needed to restore life in the city was estimated at just over US$ 1.5 billion. However, the estimation was incomplete and, in some segments, unfeasible. While it contained a list of obliterated and damaged cultural heritage sites, the monetary value of the heritage destruction was not accurately estimated.

**Urbicide of Sarajevo**

Already in 1992 it was possible to define the two main targets of the systematic destruction of Sarajevo: its urban community and its urban fabric. Shortly after the start of the siege, the destruction of Sarajevo was defined as urbicide. In studies on the destruction of the Bosnian cities of Sarajevo and Mostar, this neologism, that had only been used sporadically since 1963, was defined in scholarly terms within social, legal and urban planning theories. These studies feature two main positions: the first being that urbicide is a specific type of crime in need of conventional definition and legal determination and, the second, that urbicide is a mode of genocide.

Coward (2004) indicates the relationship between urbicide and genocide by using the example of Sarajevo, arguing that urbanity is destroyed precisely as a destruction of the conditions of the possibility of heterogeneity. As a response to the destruction, the strategy of Sarajevo’s post-war recovery implicitly includes two overarching aims: (a) protecting the urban fabric; and (b) protecting the heterogeneity upon which the city is founded.

Although the whole city was under fire, the constant and systematic shelling of cultural foci removed any doubt that cultural heritage was a target of war. Numerous public buildings that testified to the community and diversity of its people - including museums, galleries, mosques, churches, archives, theatres, cemeteries, chapels - were damaged, usually by several direct artillery hits. From the very outset of the siege, culture was among the central casualities:

1. The Oriental Institute was systematically shelled on 17 May 1992 until its neo-Renaissance style building went up in flames, along with the 5,211 codices it housed.
2. The Bey’s Mosque was hit by 60 projectiles in October 1992. It is known as the most central and largest of Sarajevo’s mosques, which was built in the classic Ottoman style in 1531 by a student of Mimar Sinan.
3. The Olympic Games Museum, located in the nineteenth century building Vila Mandić, was destroyed at the start of the war in 1992. The Museum was targeted with incendiary projectiles and, when it started burning, shelling continued accompanied by sniper fire to prevent access to fire fighters.

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12 The UN Commission of Experts was established under UN Security Council resolution 780 (1992) and tasked with investigating grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and other violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. As the UN Commission was terminated on 30 March 1994, the report does not include the extensive destruction that continued after April 1994.


14 Ibid.

15 Sarajevostan. 1995. *Program interventine i sveukupne sanacije objekata i sadržaja stanovanja* [Program of interventions and overall rehabilitation of facilities and housing content]. Sarajevo, Sarajevostan. (In Bosnian.)


19 NB. the Statute, case law, and judgements of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) do not reflect these theories.

4. The National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the largest and most significant institution of its kind in Bosnia, was located on the front line and suffered some 500 shells. 

Though cultural landscapes were damaged by shelling and incendiary ammunition fired from positions surrounding the city, this was not the main cause of destruction. The tall trees that were so abundant in Sarajevo became the only source of firewood during the cold Sarajevo winters, and the only fuel that could be used to cook food. Some 40,000 trees were cut down by the end of the war.

The burning of the National and University Library, situated in the historic building of the Town Hall (Vijećnica) was the most emotionally-fraught event in the besieged Sarajevo, and marked a decisive turning point in how the nature of the war was understood. Over two million library books vanished in flames (including rare books and manuscripts) and, subsequently, the morale and hope of the citizens significantly eroded.

Following this event, the official authorities of Sarajevo began requesting the UN to secure an expert mission to determine the extent of destruction to cultural heritage, and that humanitarian aid be extended to heritage. Already in May 1992, the main urban planning and construction inspector of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina started sending regular reports on the destruction of cultural and religious heritage to more than 500 addresses across the world - governments, international organizations and media outlets - via the few satellite phones in the government buildings. In October 1992, the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina started publishing the bulletin ‘Facts on War Crimes’ that regularly included updated lists of destroyed sacral buildings and architectural heritage.

However, as is often the case in official international aid activities, the significance of the destruction of heritage and the deep bonds between the population and their heritage were interminably rejected as matters of little interest. After repeated appeals and reports from Bosnian experts that heritage was a target of destruction and of crucial importance for the survival of the city, Roger C. Shrimplin and Marian Wenzel visited Sarajevo as the first international experts tasked with surveying the state of cultural heritage.

In the report ‘Destruction of Cultural Property’, M’Baye (1994) warned the UN Security Council: ‘In Bosnia, UNESCO is constantly receiving appeals regarding the destruction of historic sites. An impressive list on the subject has been published by the Council of Europe.’ Experts working in Sarajevan institutions recorded the damage observed on buildings they visited by making hand drawings and notes in the margins of used paper. In 1996, this documentation was expanded and published as the ‘Catalogue of Recovery of Cultural, Historic, and Natural Heritage’ with information on 48 destroyed and 152 heavily damaged sites, while damage to other sites was estimated as milder.

26 Wenzel, M. 1993. The situation of the cultural heritage in Mostar and Sarajevo. Annex B of the third information report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Strasbourg, Council of Europe. Before coming to Sarajevo, Marian Wenzel founded the Bosnia-Herzegovina Heritage Rescue (BHHR), a foundation that played an important role in mobilising the world public in recognizing the impact of heritage destruction, and the need for its protection and integration into post-war recovery in Sarajevo.
presented to the Council of Europe, concluded with, *inter alia*, proposals to establish a network of experts in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia. It proposed establishing a base outside but adjacent to the war zone to serve as a resource centre for repair materials and expert work, as well as for gathering and exchanging information on cultural heritage. In addition, proposals to establish an international corridor of aid to Bosnian experts in their activities to rescue cultural heritage, include heritage into humanitarian aid programmes and enable cultural heritage experts to join UN peacekeeping units as observers, all had prominent support in Bosnia, yet seemed to fall on deaf ears at UN agencies.

Both Wenzel (1993) and Shrimplin (1993) pointed out that, despite extensive damage, the character of Sarajevo was preserved and it would be possible ‘to reconstruct the city and to reconstitute its historic character.’

Recovery of Sarajevo

A timeline of Sarajevo’s recovery comprises five distinct phases in two different contexts. The first, (a) recovery in bello, conducted in various forms during the war, had two stages: (i) 1992-1994, when activities were led by civil society and aimed at survival; and (ii) 1994-1996, aimed at restoring essential services for basic needs. The second phase, (b) recovery post bellum, which covers a period of more than 20 years after the end of the siege consisted of the subsequent three stages: (i) 1996-2002, the period of aid and intervention-based recovery; (ii) 2002-2014, a transitional phase from recovery to development; and (iii) 2014-onwards, during which the war scars fade and the city faces development pressure.

Sarajevan institutions have continuously played important roles in the recovery process. These include the Institute for Development Planning of Sarajevo, the Institute of Architecture and Spatial Planning of the Architecture Faculty in Sarajevo, the Institute for Construction of the City of Sarajevo, and the Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo. Their documentation, expertise and staff, together with the competent ministries have ensured continuity in the development of the urban fabric even after years of systematic destruction. At ministerial level, until 1994 the Ministry of Spatial Planning of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the assigned ministry, and thereafter ministries at the entity and cantonal level.

Furthermore, at certain stages of recovery, relevant transitional institutions have been set up, such as the Office of the Special UN Coordinator for Sarajevo (1994-1996), the Directorate for Reconstruction and Development of Sarajevo (1994-1998), the International Management Group (1994-2000), the Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency (2003-onwards), the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (1996-2003), and a number of project implementation units established within government bodies by the World Bank (1996-2002). Significant incentives for integrating heritage into the process of post-war recovery were provided by the Annex 8 Commission.

Recovery of Sarajevo in bello

1992-1994. The first stage: recovery as a means of survival under siege

From the start of the war in April 1992 until March 1994, the work of ministries, institutions and experts was based on resolving urgent problems,
determining the methodology for surveying war damage, adopting wartime regulations on spatial planning, construction and the distribution of construction materials, as well as restructuring spatial relations within the city to facilitate basic urban functions during the siege. The first planning documents entailed determining sites for war cemeteries, given that existing ones were insufficient and inaccessible to a large number of residents, and alternative locations for waste disposal, given that the city landfill site was cut off.31

Old, historic and inactive cemeteries, city parks and green areas, as well as sports stadiums, were repurposed as war burial sites. The selection of old cemeteries or parks for the burial of victims of the Siege of Sarajevo, in addition to being undoubtedly practical, also had powerful symbolic value. For those burying their loved ones and fellow citizens, these special places imbued the graves with a sense of dignity and resistance to the siege.

In July 1992, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a decree prohibiting the construction of new buildings except when the ministry responsible for spatial planning designated such construction as a necessity of war. Production and trade in construction materials in the besieged city, as well as the use of construction machinery, were placed under government control. Repairs and reconstruction of buildings were only possible by ministerial approval, and provided that the planned works would return the building to its prior state, or would involve minimal intervention to make it suitable for use.32

Culture as a means of defence and survival in besieged Sarajevo

Although the earliest official international documents on restoring life in Sarajevo did not prioritize culture or destroyed cultural heritage, from the outset of the siege culture was a fundamental means of survival and resistance for the citizens of Sarajevo. The role of culture as a tool of resistance was reinforced through the numerous activities of civic associations, intellectuals and other activists in Europe, and contributed to designating Sarajevo the European Capital of Culture in September 1993.33

Discussions on cultural heritage became a central topic in Sarajevo. Since it was impossible to ensure its protection, recording heritage destruction was aimed at raising public awareness on the nature and damage of the war in Sarajevo, as well as actions towards the preparations for post-war recovery. Both goals were unrealistic, but caring for heritage was a survival method.

This was incorporated into cultural events - concerts, theatre plays, poetry, literary meetings and exhibitions - that took place in candlelight in the theatres and galleries of Sarajevo, in improvised cultural venues and within the ruins of the National Library and the Olympic Museum. These cultural rituals in destroyed libraries and museums provided a kind of archaeological...
backdrop of a disappeared world from before and beyond the siege, and invoked a new aesthetic dimension where reality and the surreal switched places. They also served to defend the dignity of the people and, at the same time, to encode symbolic meaning of heroic sacrifice into the remains of destroyed buildings.

The Association for Intercultural Activities to Rescue Heritage (AIASN), registered in October 1992, brought together volunteers from various institutions and the University of Sarajevo who used their own archives and expertise to establish a register of threatened or damaged heritage and compile information to plan post-war recovery. The name of the organization indicated a continuous effort to maintain cultural diversity in Sarajevo and resist attempts to destroy its urbanity.34

An Art Saving Task Force was established within the First Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to protect and rescue movable heritage and prevent damaged architectural heritage from further deterioration. Together with experts from institutions responsible for protecting and maintaining heritage, the Art Saving Task Force ensured the transfer of threatened collections and archives to basements and shelters.

Experts working on protecting damaged buildings from further deterioration had limited resources at their disposal, notably materials intended for sealing shattered windows and damaged roofs on residential buildings, such as plastic foil and expanding foam. Working on these buildings always entailed exposure to shelling and sniper fire. The Director of the National Museum, Rizo Sijarić, was killed by shrapnel in December 1993 as he was affixing plastic foil from UNHCR humanitarian aid to the shattered windows of the National Museum.

Throughout the world, citizens organized numerous associations to oppose and resist ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, promote an end to the war, and begin the recovery of Sarajevo. Their activities were largely based on the notion of culture as a counteragent to war. Madelain (2017) claims that, after Sarajevo, no other conflict in the world elicited a similar form of mobilization.35

1994-1996: The second stage: restoring life to Sarajevo

The implementation of the liberal concept of peace in Sarajevo had already begun during the war in March 1994 with the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 900, which centred on the city’s basic recovery as a means of bringing an end to the war. Its preamble reiterating ‘the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and plurireligious centre’,36 thus provided the ideological framework for planning Sarajevo’s recovery.

Planning the restoration of life in Sarajevo

The central and most important part of resolution 900, paragraphs 2 and 3, determined two significant international solutions for planning and financing the recovery of Sarajevo. Firstly, the UN Secretary-General appointed a Special Coordinator for Sarajevo (SCS). Secondly, a voluntary trust fund was established, with UN Member States providing technical, expert and financial resources, including training for both the Office of the SCS and the trust fund. The US diplomat William Eagleton was appointed as the SCS. His task, in line with resolution 900, was to prepare an overall assessment and plan of action in conjunction with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and local authorities for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo.37

From April 1994 to May 1996, the Office of the SCS was responsible for coordinating and planning the recovery of Sarajevo. For this purpose, the Plan of Action ‘Restoring life to

34 Begić, A. 2000. Appeal for the protection of Art Workers. The Siege of Sarajevo 1992-1996. Sarajevo, FAMA, p. 186. As Begić (2000) further noted: ‘There were a whole bunch of very, very, very hard-working and active young people who never regretted their work and never regretted putting their lives on the line. Regardless of the shelling, the bullets, and the alarms, we sent them to save cultural objects throughout the town. That was truly a heroic time, when we were organizing cultural projects in our town. The organisation of cultural resistance went on for quite some time.’


37 Ibid.
Sarajevo’ was drawn up, comprising 144 projects across 14 sectors. Following agreements with the Development Planning Institute of the City of Sarajevo and with reference to the Urban Plan for Sarajevo 1986-2015, the Plan of Action specified three main strategies: (a) carry out urgent changes to the Urban Plan for Sarajevo for the six municipalities under Eagleton’s mandate; (b) draft a development programme for Sarajevo’s historic urban core; and (c) modify damaged areas, and develop six new zoning plans for destroyed residential areas.38

**Institutional framework for ‘Restoring life to Sarajevo’**

**UN Special Coordinator for Sarajevo**

The Office of the SCS had seven specialized teams (or action groups) tasked with defining the priority projects to be supported by bilateral and multilateral sources. They reported to a coordination committee of representatives of major donors, international organizations, UN peacekeeping forces and local authorities. Each team was chaired by a full-time manager and a UN official, and staffed with experts seconded by the United Kingdom Overseas Development Agency, the governments of Sweden, France and Italy, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the Région Île de France. These action groups did not implement recovery projects.39

**UNESCO Office in Sarajevo**

Although UNESCO established an office in Sarajevo in August 1994, the office was not operational until the end of 1995. At the time of drafting the SCS Plan of Action, the UNESCO Executive Board emphasized that the ‘[d]estruction of the religious and secular heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina turned into a policy of cultural cleansing, the proven process of which must be presented and analysed for the international community so that it will not happen again’.40 While it further indicated the prospect of launching an international campaign for cultural heritage rescue in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Organization’s Medium-Term Plan for 1990-1995 did not envisage embarking on additional international campaigns.41

**Directorate for Reconstruction and Development of Sarajevo (DORS)**

The Directorate for Reconstruction and Development (DORS) was founded in Sarajevo as a partner and local counterpart to the Office of the SCS. The Director of DORS was the long-standing General Director of Hidrogradnja, a world-renowned Bosnian civil engineering company. DORS was staffed with 30 Sarajevo experts who were employed in city institutions or departments of the city administration. The flow of information between DORS and the Office of the SCS was not established in a way that ensured the coordination and full involvement of DORS in planning and project implementation. One of the reasons for this was that ‘[d]uring this state of siege, Sarajevan decision-makers also had limited access to information to further their efforts in simply reorganizing institutions and planning for reconstruction’.42

**Informal planning of Sarajevo’s recovery**

Local institutions in possession of pre-war plans and documentation on Sarajevo that were tasked with planning found themselves on the margins of the process to develop projects indicated in the Plan of Action. The concentration of authorities in Sarajevo (state, city, and the Office of the SCS) risked carrying out unsynchronized and overlapping solutions, which sometimes marginalized or completely excluded city institutions and their experts. There were concerns that the cooperation of the Office of the SCS and the state authorities in Sarajevo’s recovery process would result in unplanned and unsystematic implementation based on short-term solutions, which was expressed by the Association of Urban Planners of Bosnia and

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38 Apart from the plan to relocate wartime cemeteries from parks and green areas and landscaping activities, project No. 138 included ‘protection of historic buildings’ as a separate activity, although the protected cultural heritage was incorporated in other projects, such as project No. 139, which foresaw the recovery of public buildings, restoration of educational institutions, etc.


40 UNESCO. 1994. The situation of the cultural and architectural heritage as well as of educational and cultural institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Doc. 144/EX 34. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000096973 (Accessed 26 November 2017.)

41 Ibid.

The disproportion between the readiness and willingness of scientists in Sarajevo and the conduct of official institutions responsible for shaping urban development is staggering, and the city still has no vision of its development, no development concept, no program of recovery, and faces a whole range of unresolved issues of strategic importance.43

The informal work of experts from different parts of the world was related to the urban planning of reconstruction, and providing technical assistance to Sarajevan experts to enhance their capacities and complete tasks. In this respect, the Global Network for Rebuilding (GNR), founded by Jay Craig in 1994, played an important role. The GNR, a consortium of American academics allied with a group of the Birmingham Bosnia Task Force, was considered to be of utmost importance to providing land planning assistance to reconstruction efforts in Sarajevo, in the form of Geographic Information Systems (GIS).44

Financing the implementation of the Plan of Action ‘Restoring life to Sarajevo’

The process of recovery during the war was coined by the international community as a ‘period of restoring life to Sarajevo’. The whole process was managed by the international community, while the identification of priorities and funding had a transient character in connection to humanitarian aid. The two most important instruments for financing the recovery were the Trust Fund for the implementation of the Plan of Action ‘Restoring life to Sarajevo’, and the Quick Impact Fund for small projects to establish basic services for Sarajevans, which intended to serve as a bridge between restoration and larger reconstruction efforts.

Voluntary Trust Fund for Sarajevo

The Plan of Action divided projects into: (a) urgent, the costs of which were estimated at US$ 254 million; and (b) transitional, estimated at US$ 285 million. Some US$ 2 million were earmarked for restoring and protecting cultural heritage, which would only have been sufficient to cover the most urgent works to protect damaged monuments from further deterioration. At a donor conference in New York in June 1994, 27 countries pledged $US 95 million to support the Plan of Action, and some countries financed projects on a bilateral basis. Of the pledged funds, the UN Trust Fund had at its disposal US$ 18.1 million45 that enabled the implementation of 55 projects, notably in healthcare, water, electricity and gas supply. Urban planning and the restoration of cultural heritage were not listed as priorities. They were among 89 projects that remained out of the scope of implementation until 1996.

Bosnian institutions and civil society continued to point out the importance of prioritizing cultural heritage in restoring life to Sarajevo. Wenzel (1994) believes that the marginalization of heritage in the recovery plans of Sarajevo was manipulated by the public sentiment of countries contributing funds to the Plan of Action:

Few people seem to have considered the disastrous social effects which will result from international indifference towards Bosnia’s cultural monuments. In a war where symbols of cultural identity have played such an important part, the psychological benefits which would follow from the restoration of these damaged symbols would be huge. Bosnians themselves understand this. Unfortunately, the decisions about priorities in the reconstruction budget are being made not by Bosnians, but by outsiders.46

The first visible example of placing cultural heritage in an anti-war action programme of the international community was an appeal made by the Director-General of UNESCO in late 1993 for the urgent assistance and reconstruction of Sarajevo’s National and University Library, ‘which is a symbol of the country’s cultural heritage and the heart of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s cultural and intellectual life’.47

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Quick Impact Fund for Sarajevo

A Quick Impact Fund was established to ensure more efficient implementation of emergency projects under the Plan of Action. Funds were allocated to 200 projects, each of which did not exceed US$ 15,000.\textsuperscript{48} Once again, cultural heritage and cultural institutions were left without the support of the international community.

Strengths and shortcomings of the recovery \textit{jus in bello}

Positive effects

1. The earliest activities of recording war damage, adjusting spatial capacities for war defense, and planning post-war recovery had, above all, social and psychological effects on the citizens of Sarajevo. At the same time that the besieged city was faced with unfamiliar living conditions, derived of money, traffic and communications, and exposed to constant terror, there was a need to systematically organize the use of space and resources for more than 300,000 inhabitants to avoid plague, hunger and cold, while providing for burials in conditions of restricted movement.

2. Space management and the regulation of construction and use of building materials, together with maintaining the cultural institutions and cultural life of the city, constituted a form of micro-resistance and a survival strategy. In addition to medicine, food and energy, people in Sarajevo also required humanitarian aid in the form of books, paper, stationary, photography accessories, fireproofed boxes for art and movable heritage, and musical instruments.

3. The Plan of Action provided a systematic approach to establishing basic utility systems, thus it temporarily reduced the impact of the siege on the population, and demonstrated the first sign of the international community’s determination to liberate Sarajevo by diplomatic means. Project implementation was efficient, direct and free from Bosnian legal procedures.

4. The presence and competence of international experts of the Office of the SCS from 1994 reduced the hurdles in project implementation caused by political disagreements between the parties involved in the war, or by the lack of coordination between local institutions and experts.

5. The decision by the international community to initiate a systematic approach to the restoration of Sarajevo during the war contributed to peace negotiations and reducing the siege regime, and further allowed for the periodic supply of water and energy, as well as more regular food provision. The impact of the decision was of particular importance to the population of Sarajevo because, apart from improving the conditions for survival in the city, it brought hope that the long-awaited concrete action and solidarity of the international community would ensure recovery and sustainable peace.

6. The significance of restoring Sarajevo’s city townscape and its heritage assets was recognized and included in the Plan of Action, although the level of priority given to restoration did not correspond to the expectations and needs of Sarajevans, nor to its high symbolic value in the overall recovery process.

7. The work of the Office of the SCS identified problems and challenges in project implementation, which significantly reduced adverse impacts on subsequent stages of recovery. It offset the inadequate capacities of the City of Sarajevo to assume responsibility for project management, especially financial management, which was the major weakness of Bosnian experts. A proposal was made to USAID that underlined the pertinent need for institutional and policy reform, especially ‘designing and installing completely new financial systems and approaches’.\textsuperscript{49} This was also key to the subsequent stages of Sarajevo recovery.

Constraints, weaknesses and failures

1. As war activities continued, some of the funds pledged at donor conferences for the restoration of life in Sarajevo never reached the Trust Fund. Project implementation was significantly hampered by political and military blackmail.


2. Whilst the Office of SCS was responsible for identifying priority projects to be funded from available resources, the implementation of the projects was carried out by a large number of organizations that had not been selected against clear tender criteria. The process became exceedingly cumbersome to be managed by the Office of the SCS, difficult to coordinate, and complicated for financial monitoring.

3. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo’s city institutions considered the substantive work of the Office of the SCS, in particular prioritizing and managing donor funds, as inadequate, non-transparent and, in some cases, completely flawed. Similarly, the City of Sarajevo was excluded from these processes. The national and city authorities pointed to unnecessary or unsound planning priorities, and the irrational, mismanaged and disproportionately high expenditure of the international community in relation to the needs of the citizens of Sarajevo. They insisted that the Office of the SCS be replaced by the DORS, or that the DORS should have a more direct role in the process.

4. Concerning project implementation, there was an excessive number of organizations involved, which incumbered the monitoring and control of work. Moreover, some of them were incompetent and caused harm through poor implementation. Bosnian experts and companies were deprived of the opportunity to lead the recovery of Sarajevo with the help of the international community.

5. On the other hand, the Office of the SCS and international officials claimed that the exclusion of Bosnian experts and authorities was related to the fulfilment of resolution 900 to preserve Sarajevo as a multi-religious and multicultural city. They argued that there was a danger of corruption and an inherited, socialist, non-transparent and centralized management system. Similarly, they asserted that there was a large brain drain from Bosnian institutions resulting from the years-long siege, as remaining experts were unable to keep up with technological changes and planning methodology, and were thus unsuitable to take part in the projects. The precise analysis made by De Groot and Green (1994) for USAID points to the problem of the marginalization of the City of Sarajevo departments, and that ‘[c]larification of the roles of various involved organizations in meeting emergency requirements and framing overall reconstruction plans would be beneficial.’

6. The failure of the international community to fully grasp the seriousness of appeals by the Bosnian people during the first stage of the recovery, particularly those concerning the significance of cultural heritage for the war-torn society, demonstrated unwillingness to change the established framework of action. The Sarajevo case has shown that a dilemma over ‘what to prioritize during a state of war: human lives or heritage protection?’ is misplaced. The comparative elements are completely different in nature and set on different levels. Its erroneous assumption is as absurd as ‘what comes first – water supply or human lives?’, ‘medications or human lives?’, ‘a roof over heads or human lives?’, etc. Those whose lives were at stake, the citizens of Sarajevo, persistently sought to show that heritage is important for the lives of individuals and communities.

7. From the adoption of resolution 900, it took seven years until an integrated approach to reconstruction of cultural heritage began in Sarajevo, in which the urban community, its heritage, infrastructure, economy, education and governmental bodies formed an integrated whole. The seven-year delay significantly contributed to the transformation of the urban fabric, involving additional demolition and disintegration, as well as the destruction of urbanity and the ‘conditions of the heterogeneity’. In other words, it meant the goals of war were achieved by the means intended to achieve peace.

Recovery of Sarajevo post bellum

1996-2002. Third stage: the international aid dependent post-war recovery of Sarajevo

The third stage of recovery of Sarajevo began in 1996 after the siege was lifted and the Dayton Agreement was signed. Many strategic and methodological changes had already begun.
in late 1995. In the international community’s nomenclature, this period was marked by reconstruction, with the high-level involvement of the international community and entirely dependent on foreign financial aid. The word ‘reconstruction’, in terms of the international community’s strategy, not only implied building the destroyed city back into its pre-war condition, but also a creative approach and possible rejuvenation. In April 1996, the Office of the SCS was closed and its planning and coordinating activities were taken over by the World Bank and the European Union (EU) – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, with the assistance of the World Bank, the European Union and USAID, Bosnia and Herzegovina launched a Priority Reconstruction Programme for the whole country worth US$ 5.1 billion.53

Under the administrative organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulated by the Dayton Agreement, Sarajevo Canton became responsible for development planning. All the institutions that had been in charge of spatial and economic planning, as well as the protection of cultural heritage within the City of Sarajevo, were transformed into cantonal institutes. At the same time, the stage of immediate post-war recovery was a period of legal and institutional framework consolidation intended to enable local departments to take a central role in project planning and implementation. However, this process was fully dependent on international aid. From 1996 onwards, the Sarajevo Canton institutions, with international technical support, overtook planning the recovery of Sarajevo.

Planning of recovery

After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the first recovery planning instruments presented in the donor conferences included:

1. **Sarajevo recovery projects**, a document containing 1,353 projects organized across 10 areas. The first proposed project – presented as urgent – was drafting a recovery and development strategy for Sarajevo within a period of six months. The document included an invitation to the international community to help Sarajevan institutions to define the strategy in terms of applicable market laws; managing the city development; economic transition; implementing the development documents; building relationships with economic enterprises; securing the financing of city functions; establishing the land market, business premises and city property management; creating conditions for foreign capital investment; and defining the interests of public companies. The first four priority projects in the area of ‘spatial and urban development’ were aimed at capacity-building. Cultural heritage was explicitly integrated into the proposed priority project ‘Sarajevo Recovery’, containing 63 individual projects, 16 of which were described as urgent. Urgent projects entailed undertaking the necessary technical measures to protect damaged facilities against further deterioration or to rehabilitate them for the purpose of securing their use, especially in cases related to economic revival. It was proposed that all the sites concerned be restored to their *status quo ante*.54

2. **Action Plan for the Revitalization of Sarajevo City Greenery 1993-2000**, played a symbolic role in the reconstruction of the urban landscape. The programme highlighted the functional and environmental necessity for the urgent planting of new trees and the revitalization of Sarajevo’s parks and alleys.55

It should be noted that the extent of heritage destruction in Sarajevo and the war methods used were different from those in other parts of Bosnia. In other places, destruction was carried out in close proximity and the fragments of destroyed buildings were largely taken away from their original locations to prevent their restoration. Nevertheless, the symbolic impact of heritage destruction on the Sarajevan community is indisputable. In addition to the fact that the remains of damaged Sarajevan heritage were *in situ*, there were comprehensive volumes of records of their history and condition prior to destruction that remained intact and archived at the Institute for Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton.

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53 USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1999. *Bosnia reconstruction program*, May 1999. s.l., USAID.
54 City Planning Institute. 1996a. *Sarajevo reconstruction projects*. Sarajevo, City of Sarajevo.
‘Development orientation’ of post-war recovery plans for Sarajevo

The development orientation of Sarajevo was outlined in two key documents adopted in the period 1996 to 2002:

1. **Sarajevo Canton Development Strategy until 2015**, a four-volume document, was the result of the coordinated work of 18 institutions and public hearings. It addressed 48 development sectors, and defined specific goals towards sustainable transformation by strengthening the economic basis, and restoring and building a comfortable living environment and profitable business framework.56

2. **Urban Plan of the City of Sarajevo for the Urban Area of Sarajevo for the period 1986 - 2015** (Figure 5) was revised and adapted to spatial, social, economic and geopolitical changes, and was specifically aimed at improving living conditions through urban arrangement.57

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**Recovery based on cultural plurality**

The Dayton Agreement provided instruments for integrating heritage into the transitional justice process through Annex 8. By 2000, the Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton had prepared 66 studies on individual architectural objects, complexes and sites as part of a petition for their declaration as national monuments.58 The UNESCO Office started working in Sarajevo in late 1995. A short-term action plan was prepared, which included cooperation with institutions in charge of heritage protection, financial and technical assistance to draft a White Paper of Destroyed Heritage and prepare a study for the nomination of Sarajevo to the UNESCO World Heritage List.59

The UNESCO World Heritage nomination file for Sarajevo was designed as a response to urbicide. The scope of the nominated area includes the entire historic urban area of Sarajevo, from Kozija ćuprija in the east to Marijin dvor in the west, a ‘unique symbol of universal multiculture - continual open city’.60 The document claims that the universal and unique values of Sarajevo, as per criteria V of the **Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention**, are not exclusively attributed to individual buildings and complexes, but also the morphological and symbolic relations between them, which testify to the unique combination of differences and their overlap (as opposed to confrontation) since the fifteenth century.

In line with this approach, the Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton passed a petition to the Annex 8 Commission to designate the core historic urban area of Sarajevo as a national monument. By incorporating it in the Provisional List of National Monuments in June 2000, when the recovery stage of Sarajevo entered

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57 City of Sarajevo. 1996. *Izmjene i dopune Urbanističkog plana grada* [Amendments to the Urban Plan]. Sarajevo, City of Sarajevo.


development, a strict and complex approval regimen was established for the construction of new facilities in the historic core of Sarajevo.

In 2000, the Government of Sarajevo Canton adopted a Historic City Core Development Programme (Figure 6). A framework for integrated cultural heritage protection was established, which allowed for a balanced approach that took into account the preservation of the townscape and continuous development.

The rapid restoration of architectural heritage was not a strategic priority in Sarajevo. The action plan was focused on the protection of damaged structures from further deterioration. It lacked, however, the integration of measures for cultural heritage management into development, and detailed urban planning to establish resilience mechanisms against investment pressures during the immediate post-war period when the rule of law was weak. This was compounded by institutions that were too fragile to ensure appropriate monitoring and regulation.

Specific issues of land policy and real estate ownership

Social ownership and a centralized economy were the two key pillars of the socialist economic context. In the periods 1918 to 1941 and 1945 to 1990, a large number of privately-owned objects and premises were seized and converted into social ownership through the process of ‘nationalization of property’. All spaces owned by religious communities that did not directly serve religious rituals were nationalized, including religious schools, hammams, residential buildings, churches, synagogues and mosques. More than 55% of dwellings, and all public amenities, industrial facilities, infrastructure and urban construction land became socially-owned. Persons who were living or working in the properties were granted ‘the right to use’ the property in accordance with the socialist laws. The post-war recovery in Sarajevo started with three strategic goals concerning land policy and real estate ownership:

1. Restitution of the ownership and tenancy rights of pre-war users. In accordance with the Dayton Agreement, the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) was established, which was in charge of the return of property and tenancy rights for displaced persons and refugees, as well as to all those illegally deprived of property during the war.

2. Privatization of property under social ownership, which involved different solutions for different categories of property. Religious communities were returned property in cases where there were no ownership disputes following denationalization. Socially-owned public enterprises (water supply, sewage, power plants, transmission systems, infrastructure, health services, and cultural, scientific and education institutions) and urban construction land became the property of the state. The state offered state-owned enterprises for sale in accordance with legal procedures. Holders of tenancy rights in state-owned dwellings were entitled to buy the dwellings in the form of ‘certificates’. The state issued certificates as compensation for unpaid income during the war, which was granted to any person who, during the war, regularly reported to work, was retired or was a demobilized soldier. Property traded in the privatization process that was registered cultural heritage placed a higher burden on the buyer due to their use restrictions and stringent procedures to obtain a development permit, which made it difficult for heritage sites to be privatized.

3. Denationalization is a process that is yet to be legally regulated since there are many situations in which it is in conflict with privatization laws. While a large number of nationalized properties constitute cultural
heritage, unresolved ownership issues make it difficult to enforce post-war restoration and protection measures.

Institutional framework for the implementation of the third stage of recovery of Sarajevo

Although dependent on international assistance, the six-year period of immediate post-war recovery strengthened the capacities of cantonal, municipal and city institutions to take over the recovery planning and implementation efforts. The main stakeholders in the third stage of recovery planning and implementation can be classified as both transitional and permanent.

The International Management Group (IMG), a transitional, non-profit institution founded in 1994 by representatives from 17 countries\(^{62}\), managed the implementation of a large number of projects. Activities of the IMG were funded through contributions from its Member States. IMG teams were composed of national and international experts who carried out the projects in coordination with representatives of local institutions.\(^{63}\)

The World Bank and the EU-EBRD took the lead in the post-war recovery projects from 1996 to 2000, following the closure of the Office of the SCS. In particular, the World Bank played a central role in this process, and supported 45 projects (financed mostly by IDA credits) and committed over US$ 1.02 billion to help the reconstruction and development of virtually every segment of the war-torn country, including support for the first generation of reforms'.\(^{64}\)

All activities and projects led by the IMG, the World Bank and the EU involved local experts. The success of the post-war recovery process of Sarajevo can be credited to the early and balanced inclusion of the social sector in defining priorities, the ownership of local institutions, effective coordination mechanisms, rapid project implementation, and adaptable, strategic goals.\(^{65}\)

Project Implementation Units (PIU), established within government ministries with the assistance of the World Bank, played a role in harmonizing the recovery process and transferring the responsibility for project planning, implementation and funding to local institutions. Funds were audited in accordance with World Bank standards and procedures. This approach provided improved management, especially in the case of small-scale projects. The World Bank’s main focus in the cultural heritage sector was Mostar. Heritage projects in Sarajevo were funded by the European Commission or through bilateral aid.

Local government institutions regained and retained their competences through the administration changes. Sarajevo Canton is organized into three governance levels: (a) the local community/municipality is title holder of the state property and responsible for issuing development permits for private and small-scale buildings; (b) the City Council authorizes the plans; and (c) the Canton, in cooperation with relevant ministries and institutions, is responsible for development planning and implementation. The main institutions tasked with development planning are the Sarajevo Canton Institute for Development Planning (economic and spatial planning), the Sarajevo Canton Institute for Construction (land policy, tenders for recovery and development projects), and the Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton (heritage documentation, archaeological research, implementation and supervision of cultural heritage conservation projects, and drafting a chapter on the revitalization of cultural and natural heritage in physical development plans).

\(^{62}\) Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, together with the European Commission and with the support of UNHCR.

\(^{63}\) IMG – Federation Ministry for Physical Planning and Environmental Protection. 1999. Priručnik o tehničkim i obligacionim uvjetima za projektovanje i izvođenje radova na izgradnji, rekonstrukciji, sanaciji adaptaciji građevina visokogradnje [Manual on Technical and Obligatory Requirements for Designing and Conducting Works of Construction, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation or Adaptation of Buildings]. Sarajevo, s.n. (In Bosnian.) During this stage, a significant undertaking was the publishing of a manual on relevant laws and building standards applicable to project proposal writing, construction tenders, supervision, control and maintenance of buildings. This was enhanced by training for local professionals involved in recovery across Bosnia, and included laws, international regulations, standards and cultural heritage management.


Local contractors were involved in project implementation through transparent, international tendering procedures, which significantly contributed to the revival of the local economy and the full use of donated funds. The chaos caused by numerous implementing organizations from around the world with inadequate procurement systems, weak bidding selection criteria and abbreviated procedures, was significantly mitigated after 1996. Yet, since anticorruption mechanisms were not in place from the beginning, this stage of recovery was accompanied by a high degree of corruption.

Informal planning through various consultations continued after 1996. Experts and the public continued to underscore that cultural memory was the most significant symbolic component of recovery, and suggested ways for its systematic inclusion in community revival processes.

The largest international meeting on post-war recovery ‘The Bosnian Paradigm’ was held in Sarajevo in November 1998. Scholars from around the world presented 232 papers on various aspects of recovery. The significant potential of the available knowledge, insight and proposals, however, was neither recognized nor utilized in the post-war recovery process.

The foundation Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHwB), a Swedish NGO founded in 1995, demonstrates how civil society can have a more direct connection with societal problems and needs. Despite having fewer capacities, it could more easily apply a 3P (people, place, policy) - based approach to recovery. Through its restoration projects, including the Despić House – the house of a well-known Sarajevan Orthodox merchant family that hosted the first private theatre in Sarajevo – and later the National Museum, CHwB set the standard for foreign assistance provision in the war-torn community:

1. Heritage projects were prioritized by CHwB in recovery efforts, based on consultations with the local municipality, colleagues, planners and civil society, who ‘to the Swedish Ambassador’s surprise’ placed heritage projects high on the priority list.

2. Conservation approaches applied the most rigorous professional standards in terms of preparation, methodology, materials and techniques, and involved public consultation.

3. CHwB experts conducted hands-on training to boost the capacities of Bosnian experts, thus ensuring the added value of project sustainability.

4. All materials, personnel and consultancy services were procured in Bosnia. Only in exceptional cases were goods and services imported from Sweden.

5. CHwB encouraged civil society participation in various culture-based recovery projects during the later period of ‘post-war development’.

Financing mechanisms for the third stage of recovery of Sarajevo

In the period 1996-2002, Sarajevo recovery projects were largely financed by: (a) funds collected at five donor conferences organized by the World Bank in cooperation with the European Union, amounting to US$ 5.1 billion for projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina; (b) bilateral assistance implemented through national development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), the United Kingdom Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); and (c) donations from various foundations and religious organizations. Data on funds independently managed by the City of Sarajevo were not available for this study. One might assume that a significant percentage of the funds was spent on


67 In the invitation to the conference, the organizers wrote, inter alia: ‘One can feel with trepidation that the denial of common life of Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the towns of Bosnia and Herzegovina ominously announces the possible fate of the world as a whole’ (Papić, et al., 1998).


projects in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{70}  

The most important project of the cultural heritage integrated recovery – the National and University Library in Sarajevo from 1995 to 1997 – was financed by the European Commission (survey works) and the Government of Austria (consolidation of the structure, interior support scaffolding, and repair of the steel dome with glass roof cladding above the hall) totalling EUR 750,000 (US$ 850,000).\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{2002-2014: The fourth stage - post-war development}

The fourth stage of the post-war recovery of Sarajevo was marked by the following key features:

1. \textbf{Strategic commitment to meet the requirements for BiH to join the EU}

The World Bank was the principal funder of recovery projects until 2002, at which point the lead was taken by the European Commission. Since then, the European Union’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) has become the most significant functional and financial framework for improving the environment in Sarajevo, which has been carried out through integral planning based on the principles of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society.

2. \textbf{Systematic implementation of Annex 8 of the Dayton Agreement}

Since the establishment of the Annex 8 Commission in 2002, a total of 119 cultural heritage sites or objects within the Sarajevo area have been declared national monuments.

This is an ongoing process, and the number of registered national monuments in Sarajevo is foreseen to increase in the coming years.

The Federal Ministry of Physical Planning is responsible for granting approval for conservation works (preservation, restoration, reconstruction, adaptation) or the presentation of cultural heritage. Cultural sites that are not registered as national monuments fall under the authority of the Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton.

\textbf{3. Consolidated institutions for the protection of cultural heritage under the jurisdiction of Sarajevo Canton.}

An integrated approach to cultural heritage protection has been systematically implemented in all development and regulatory planning. The capacities of local institutions have significantly increased. In the period from 2000 to 2010, the Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton carried out 107 research projects on the protection of cultural and historical (movable and immovable), and natural heritage, 23 of which were studies on cultural heritage protection and used as part of a detailed regulatory plan for an area in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{4. The Spatial Plan of Sarajevo Canton 2003-2023}

One of the 16 objectives laid down in the Spatial Plan of Sarajevo Canton (Figure 7) asserts that ‘peculiar landscape, scenery, tradition, customs, cultural identity’ must be acknowledged as ‘significant features of development’ of the city. The Spatial Plan reiterates the compactness of the historic core of Sarajevo, and the necessity to preserve the features of its historic urban landscape, image, structure and form. It classifies historic wholes as: (a) historic urban area (the boundaries of which match those of the area inscribed on the World Heritage Tentative List, i.e. 250.5 ha); (b) historic urban core (129.4 ha); and (c) the old town area (54 ha), and is supported by a stringent protection regime. The Spatial Plan lists 891 cultural heritage sites in the area of Canton Sarajevo, of which 289 are located in the Stari Grad municipality, and 209 in the Centar municipality.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{70} As to the arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the International Monetary Fund (IMF): On 20 December 1995, SDR 30.3 million (US$ 45 million) was approved under the IMF’s emergency post-conflict assistance for political and economic reintegration, rebuilding infrastructure, and creating the basis for a market economy. On 29 May 1998, a stand-by arrangement of SDR 60.6 million (US$ 90 million) (50% of quota) was later augmented on 28 June 1999 to SDR 77.51 million (US$ 115 million), and further augmented on 31 March 2000 to SDR 94.41 million (US$ 140.2 million). On 2 August 2002 the Executive Board approved the second stand-by arrangement of SDR 67.60 million (US$ 100 million). UN in BiH. n.d. \textit{International Monetary Fund. IMF Presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina}. \url{http://ba.one.un.org/content/unct/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/un-agencies/imf.html} (Accessed 27 November 2017.)

\textsuperscript{71} Institute for the Protection of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton. 2011. \textit{Katalog obnove kulturno-historijskog i priродnog nasljeđa Kantona Sarajevo 2000-2010} [Catalogue of restoration of the cultural, historical and natural heritage of Sarajevo Canton 2000-2010]. Sarajevo, Institute for the Protection of the Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton. (In Bosnian.)

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Government of Sarajevo Canton. 2006. \textit{Prostorni plan Kantona Sarajevo od 2003-2023 godine} [Spatial plan of Sarajevo Canton from 2003-2023]. Sarajevo, Government of Sarajevo Canton. (In Bosnian.)
5. Continuous funding of integrated cultural heritage protection through the Sarajevo Canton, private funds, loans and donations

Integrated conservation projects and the integration of heritage into urban planning are funded through the Sarajevo Canton budget. Individual cultural heritage conservation projects are financed through the budgets of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (sites from the List of National Monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Danger), City of Sarajevo, municipalities, and cultural heritage foundations, as well as through donations. Several significant building ensembles in the centre of the city remain in a state of ruin as the investment required for their conservation and adaptive reuse exceeds the budgets of the institutions responsible for heritage preservation in the Sarajevo Canton.

6. The Integrated Rehabilitation Project Plan/Survey of the Architectural and Archaeological Heritage (IRPP/SAAH) Joint Programme

The IRPP/SAAH was implemented by the Council of Europe and the European Union in South-Eastern European countries from 2003 to 2010, and was followed by the Ljubljana Process until 2014. The Council of Europe, in cooperation with experts from nine countries of the region, launched the project to demonstrate the value of heritage for society and build trust among individuals and communities within a process of transitional justice, and during a period of political, economic and social transition. The IRPP/SAAH was the central and most successful component of the Regional Programme on Cultural and Natural Heritage in South-East Europe, and directly impacted the post-war recovery of Sarajevo.
Since 2003, the reconstruction of the National and University Library has been one of 220 prioritized interventions funded by the IPA. The first study on the building’s condition and consolidation works to protect it from further decay were carried out from 1995 to 1997. From 2002 to 2004, the most threatened structural elements were reconstructed in order to prevent the collapse of the walls and the central hall. The European Commission provided €2.25 million (US$ 2.56 million) for this purpose.

The reconstructed City Hall epitomizes the history of both its use and destruction. It accommodates the City of Sarajevo ceremonial halls and permanent exhibitions of rare books from the National and University Library and the history of the City Hall. The central hall is used for temporary exhibitions, concerts and performances, and the restaurant and souvenir shop contribute to the building’s sustainability.

‘The rehabilitation process was based on the “IRPP/SAAH methodology”, which established a set of conceptual guidelines designed to bring about tangible benefits, both for local communities and for the fragile historic environment itself.’

The wider benefits of investment in cultural heritage: Case studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Strasbourg, Council of Europe.

2014-onwards: The fifth stage - pressures of development and shaping oblivion

The reconstructed Vijećnica was open to the public on 28 June 2014, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which marked the beginning of the First World War. The complex and complete reconstruction of the building left no trace of the surreal aesthetics of burnt walls. It is as if this splendid and rejuvenated building sends a message that the scars of conflict – from 1914 to 2014 – have no place in Sarajevo’s future urbanity. This overlaying of the dark past with embellished reconstruction signals an intent to conceal the enduring trauma. The opulent and skilful rejuvenation of the Vijećnica is both an escape from the memory of terror and a self-imposed form of oblivion. Despite these efforts, the war memoryscapes remain the most dominant formative factors of Sarajevo’s historic urban landscape. The city is thus stuck in limbo, between memory and forgetting, between urban continuity and urban revolution.

The urban fabric still contains the ruins of notable buildings, which are neither planned for demolition nor restoration. They are a part of Sarajevo’s historic urban landscape; a layer that provides an authentic testimony of the war period. The physical structure of Sarajevo was reconstructed by 2014, however, the preservation of some of the remaining ruins and their adaptive reuse are more pertinent for enhancing the city’s multi-layered nature than bold reconstruction. In the development process of every city, re-establishing meanings and relations are a precondition for the city’s continuity. Yet the strong pressure of private capital risks impeding the preservation, presentation and reuse of these ruins. The threat of their removal for the sake of new development hangs over them.

On the other hand, the significant influx of domestic and foreign investment to projects in the city centre, such as shopping malls and residential condominiums, has resulted in unplanned construction that threatens to overshadow Sarajevo’s urban compactness and physical continuity.

Existing urban plans are inflexible in their provision for the harmonious development of Sarajevo in new contexts. At the moment, the Sarajevan authorities are attempting to make changes to the planning environment, and provide the conditions for balanced development while adapting to social changes.
The following three processes are central to these efforts:

1. **Development Strategy of the Sarajevo Canton until 2020**

The Development Strategy of the Sarajevo Canton was prepared in line with European guidelines for economic, social and spatial development planning. It was drafted as part of the Integrated Local Development Project (ILDP), a joint initiative of the Swiss Government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in BiH. It includes the aim to re-brand Sarajevo Canton as a unique tourist destination and promote its natural, cultural and historical potential in view of accelerating economic growth. Cultural tourism has become one of the prioritized development activities.

2. **A structured relationship has been established among ‘heritage protection institutions, owners and donors’ for donor-funded projects**

Projects financed by donors, including the TİKA, Special Fund of American Ambassadors for Cultural Heritage, European Commission, etc. is formalized through the signing of a treaty that ensures legal obligations, together with the procedures and standards for cultural heritage protection in Bosnia. In addition, continuous monitoring and control of project implementation must be carried out in accordance with the laws of the Sarajevo Canton.

3. **High-level public accountability for cultural heritage protection**

Despite the strong pressure of investments aimed at new constructions at the sites once occupied by historic buildings, the Sarajevan public feels very strongly about preserving the layers of memory. In 2017, the city’s citizens organized a public resistance and signed a petition to prevent the construction of a commercial building above the archaeological remains of Tašli-han, a caravanserai that was built in the sixteenth century and burned down in the nineteenth century.

When excavation works during the construction of city roads revealed the remains of two mosque ensembles, which had been demolished in the nineteenth century, groups of citizens started gathering at these sites on a daily basis to demand their preservation and proper presentation. Since the destruction of the urban fabric had strengthened the emotional attachment of the public to its heritage, in the post-war period the public began insisting on reconstructing and resurfacing the urban layers, which became the subject of public debates.

The increasing role of civil society in different segments of town planning and development, in defining the nature of the cultural scene, and in promoting heritage, provided a framework for the continuous and effective involvement of informal stakeholders in identifying and responding to challenges.
Conclusions: lessons learned in Sarajevo

The urban resilience in wartime and post-war Sarajevo was not physical in nature – the entire infrastructure could have been blocked and the buildings demolished. Rather, it was enshrined in an almost invincible relationship between people and the city. Sarajevan citizens had their own physical framework for authentic survival in urbanity. Post-war recovery planning has been more responsive and less objective-based.

Today, Sarajevo is a vibrant city with a high level of public security. It is one of the few cities in Europe where churches, synagogues and mosques require no police protection. The heterogeneity of its urban fabric has persisted. Sarajevo has remained an open city whose multicultural and multireligious environment is different and more complex than before the war. Nevertheless, it still faces threats of exclusivist and political homogenization. Indeed, the ongoing stage of post-war recovery is probably the most challenging one due to the ambivalence of the development goals.

Sarajevo is still in the post-war recovery stage and continues to be faced with numerous consequences of the war. In particular, the economy, which was destroyed by war and post-war political deadlocks, lags behind in the post-war recovery. A high level of corruption is present in all spheres of public action. As law enforcement and objective-based planning with defined monitoring mechanisms can hardly be expected to be operational at the local and national levels in war-torn societies, they have to be addressed by international institutions during the aid-based recovery stages. There are pressures of uncontrolled capital inflows that seek to circumvent laws and shape the city’s development, problems with unresolved environmental issues, and so on. Yet, these issues are common to many other cities that have not been exposed to a siege, destruction or a massive brain-drain.

In short, Sarajevo will remain, for a long time, a source of lessons learned on the access to post-war recovery of cities. The recovery process, like any other process, must be based on a critical approach that means taking into account the specific cultural, physical and historical context of a city. As such, the Sarajevo experience can, above all, underscore the importance of integrating the community and its cultural memory into the recovery process, which is linked to ensuring fundamental human rights and sustainable peace. Both positive and negative lessons learned can be gleaned from the actions, when examined through the lens of a 3P (people-centred, place-based, policies) approach.

People-centred approach

Several factors determined the limits of social inclusion throughout the recovery process of Sarajevo:

1. From the beginning of the war, it took more than seven years until recovery efforts became a complex system of processes that integrated the urban community, heritage, infrastructure, economy, education and governmental bodies.

2. Although the recovery started while the armed conflict was still ongoing, the international institutions hesitated to use all the means available to support Sarajevan experts, institutions and citizens to take ownership of the process. This resulted in a lack of coordinated planning and activities. The fundamental goal for the international aid agencies should be to empower local institutions, experts, and the population to take an active part in the recovery process from the earliest stage.

3. Ignoring the needs of the local community to preserve its urban identity (while basing the recovery on urban habits and cultural memory) turned the initial phases of recovery into a mere physical act of rebuilding the city at a time when international aid was of crucial importance. Cultural heritage proved to be an inevitable factor of restoring life.

4. The Sarajevo case can be used as evidence that the effective and efficient organization of recovery, a strong and institutionalized relationship between the international community and local stakeholders, and a high level of transparency from the outset – even while the war chaos threatens all the systems – are crucial to reducing corruption, and financial and time losses. This would help in establishing trust among stakeholders and in boosting the motivation of the local population to persist in ensuring the best solutions for the recovery of the community.
5. Gradual and small changes in the destroyed urban landscape, reinforced by the restoration of key heritage sites, provide a sense of security and belonging to a place. Large-scale development projects aimed at changing the pre-war urban structures can exacerbate the feeling of loss. That is why cultural rituals performed at the sites of destroyed urban foci in Sarajevo promoted a sense of belonging and the public resolve to rebuild.

6. Establishing the link between physical recovery and the undisputed right of displaced persons to repossess their property is of utmost importance in the restoration of urbanity and its heterogeneity.

7. Working with all segments of the community, especially children, to integrate cultural heritage into post-war recovery should be developed through all formal and informal networks and institutions.

8. The context of post-war recovery is never free from conflict and disputing policies. That is why the hardest task is to restore the community. This can be fostered through the universality of heritage values.

Post-war recovery policies

1. Two decades after the war, responsive planning remains the urban planning method in Sarajevo. The objective-based urban plans produced through public participatory processes have frequently been circumvented by so-called expert opinions. Expert opinions are nothing more than a response to the demands of developers, are seldom based on a comprehensive impact assessment of the development, and inhibit public participation in planning processes. Although being the most appropriate approach during the conflict, the responsive method (which enables ad hoc solutions) goes hand-in-hand with corruption and prevents sustainable and balanced development. That is why objective-based methods and community reflective planning should be developed as an aid to the war-torn society as soon as the conflict comes to a halt.

2. Small-scale, quick impact projects are more suitable for implementation in the early stages of recovery, while the post-war chaos is ongoing, as they allow for the effective involvement of the local community and reduce the possibility of corruption.

3. Recovery, apart from the physical and economic dimensions, has very strong social and symbolic connotations. For this reason, the underlying message of the Sarajevo experience is that culture-based recovery contributes to restoring harmonized relations among the aesthetic, functional and symbolic facets of the city.

4. Annex 8 of the Dayton Accords established an important framework for an integrated approach to post-war recovery. The restoration of cultural heritage was singled out as a priority in integrated recovery planning processes.
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